

Memo for DCT

Approved For Release 2005/11/25 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020058-1

1
CONFIDENTIAL

23 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, National Estimates
Assistant Director, Research and Reports
Assistant Director, Scientific Intelligence

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for Long Term Programming
of US Forces

1. Attached is a discussion of the intelligence support which must be available to the Department of Defense to assist in effective long term programming of US forces, and a suggested approach to meet this requirement.

2. Mr. Amory has scheduled a meeting to discuss this problem with the AD/NE, AD/RR and AD/SI on Monday, 26 February 1962, at 1100 in the DDI Conference Room.

6433

25X1

25X1

DOCUMENT NO. 13
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1990
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWE

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

18 JUN 1980

Approved For Release 2005/11/25 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020058-1

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

23 February 1962

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for Long-Term Planning US
Force Requirements

1. The Secretary of Defense has made known his requirement for detailed programming analysis of Sino-Soviet force structures to support long-term planning of US force requirements. Even though the Secretary requires more specific strength figures than are entirely supportable by intelligence evidence, and desires the presentation of a range which might include Soviet military postures other than that estimated to be most likely, the basic task is still directly related to our intelligence estimates and is a natural extension of our intelligence activity. We feel, therefore, that the Director of Central Intelligence ought to assume primary responsibility for meeting this requirement.

2. In order to meet this requirement, it is proposed to develop and keep current several alternative projections of the Sino-Soviet Bloc force posture as it might exist up

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

to ten years in the future. Major points of departure would be established by relevant NIE's. Annually, the Director of Central Intelligence, after USIB review, would forward to the Secretary of Defense a report embodying these alternative projections.

3. To perform this function, it is recommended that a small, integrated group (six), under the guidance of the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates and responsible directly to the Director of Central Intelligence, be organized. Defense Intelligence Agency would furnish three military members. Central Intelligence Agency would provide an economist, a scientist, and the chairman. A detailed discussion of the operation of such a group is attached.

Enclosure

- ii -

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR LONG-TERM PLANNING OF US FORCE
REQUIREMENTS

1. The Department of Defense has instituted, on an annual basis, programming of US force requirements over a five-year period. A vital part of this operation is the analysis of the cost and effectiveness of alternative US force structures which could be acquired over this period. A prime factor entering into the final solution of weapon systems is the projection of threat posed by the military forces of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Although National Intelligence Estimates include projections on many aspects of these forces this far into the future, some of the most critical estimates concerning Soviet forces do not, and no attempt is made to quantify reasonable alternative Soviet force structures on a detailed, integrated basis comparable to that to be used in US planning. It appears essential that the intelligence community should fill this need, even though in many cases the period of time would be beyond that which can be estimated with confidence.

2. It is therefore proposed that the intelligence community develop, on an annual basis, a series of alternative Soviet force postures, programming the component weapon systems

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

up to ten years into the future. The period of projection would depend in part on the apparent effective life of the various weapon systems and in part on judgments as to when potential systems could come into the inventory. The number of alternatives cannot be determined in advance, but until further experience is gained it is proposed that several should be developed. Within each force structure, the weapon systems should be grouped to conform as nearly as feasible to the force "packages," being used by the Department of Defense, i.e., central war offensive, central war defensive, general purpose, etc.

3. Alternative postures would be developed through analysis of effects which might result from significant changes in weapon systems included in one or more of the packages. For example, with respect to the strategic forces, the major variations could be hypothesized from the inclusion or exclusion of an antiballistic missile system, hardened missile sites, large yield weapons, advanced bombers, new type weapon systems, etc. The above analysis would take into account possible tactical employment, including target systems or other US forces against which they could most

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

effectively be employed. In addition, possible Soviet responses to changes in US posture would be taken into consideration; the potential US posture to be obtained from the DOD. The structure of the alternatives might also take into account modifications in the overall Sino-Soviet external posture. These alternatives would, in all cases, be generally consistent with National Intelligence Estimates and available evidence.

4. As part of the exercise, the alternative force structures would be costed. This would permit some rough comparisons with the US future programming, would provide a measure of the impact of a given force program on the Soviet economy and would also provide a vehicle for further exploration of the value of costing techniques to estimating future Soviet forces. Efforts would be made to develop assumptions as to the research and development required, given the particular composition of an alternative force structure.

5. In time, the maintenance on a continuing and detailed basis, of several alternative Sino-Soviet Bloc force postures, would assist in the production of National Intelligence Estimates. It would be an aid to better understanding of the

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET

factors influencing future Soviet Bloc military programs, especially as a result of the constant study through time of the interrelationships between the various components of Bloc forces, and the apparent Bloc approach to programming. It would tend to relieve the NIE's of existing pressures for precise, quantitative military projections in instances where the evidence is insufficient.

6. To meet the above requirements, it is proposed that the following be accomplished. On the basis of current NIE's, a basic Sino-Soviet Bloc force posture would be established for the current fiscal year and this projected up to 10 years in the future along the lines indicated in the estimates as most probable. This basic force posture would be reviewed following the publication of a relevant NIE. Several alternative force packages would then be developed, as explained above, and once developed, would be kept current and displayed graphically to permit comparison and study. New intelligence or new scientific findings which could modify a single weapon system or the basic concept of one alternative force would be integrated into the alternative force packages through the use

- 4 -

SECRET

SECRET

of "working papers" -- the proposed changes would be circulated and if there was no serious disagreement they would be included. In any event, the alternative Soviet forces posture would be submitted to the USIB for annual review, following which the Director for Central Intelligence would forward a report to the Secretary of Defense. The timing of the annual report would be established by the budget cycle of the Department of Defense.

7. The most important consumers of the above analysis would be the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the planning staffs of individual Services and unified and specified commands, responsible for developing proposals as to objective forces; various war gaming units; and the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. General use of a common range of data has the advantage of providing some basis for comparison of results of gaming or of the cost effectiveness of competing future weapon systems.

8. The above operation could best be performed by a small, integrated staff of senior intelligence officers, knowledgeable in the several military, economic and scientific fields, under the guidance of the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates and directly responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence. As

- 5 -

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

the members of the group would be responsible to explore out into the future, based on, but beyond the range in which their parent staffs are concentrating, they should not act as representatives but as responsible contributors to a group effort. They obviously would be dependent upon the support of all facets of the intelligence community and responsive to reactions to their collective hypotheses as elicited through the circulation of working papers. Further, knowledge on a "need-to-know" basis of projected US research and development is essential to this operation, and the security problems which this raises are more manageable by a group working together in a single secure area. Finally, as an integrated group they could be more flexible in responding to requirements which Secretary of Defense will probably levy.

9. At the same time, the close relationship with the estimative process, to be developed under the guidance of the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, would insure that the product of the group would be in consonance with National Intelligence Estimates. This relationship would be further enhanced by locating the group adjacent to the ONE in the CIA building. A close relationship at the working level would also be established with the USIB agencies which do not furnish members to the group, through the exchange of data and ideas by means of liaison officers.

- 6 -

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10. It is proposed that this group be staffed in the following manner: The Defense Intelligence Agency would provide three military officers, one from each service, in the grade of Colonel or Captain. The senior rank is necessary to insure that collectively they represent a wide range of experience and have knowledge of an entree to sources of information within their own Services. The Central Intelligence Agency would provide one economist and one scientist, and the chairman, the latter from the Office of National Estimates. To maintain continuity, no more than one military and one civilian should be replaced in any one year (thus three-year tours are required.)

11. With regard to the impact on CIA internally, it is apparent that there would be some additional demands placed on ONE, ORR, and OSI. If ONE provided the chairman as suggested, a replacement would be required.

12. ORR would be required to furnish a senior economist for full-time duty. It also seems likely that ORR would have to strengthen its staff to support the group in costing the force packages, and to develop the economic capabilities of the Bloc to support the alternative forces. ORR would also necessarily be heavily involved in any effort to analyze the trends in Soviet military-economic programming.

- 7 -

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

13. OSI would be required to furnish a senior scientist. In addition, some special coordination of effort within OSI probably would be required to provide support to the OSI member of the group.

14. It should be emphasized that the provision of intelligence support for future planning of the nature sought by DOD is a new requirement and its full implications are yet to be determined. Thus, it is recommended that whichever approach is chosen, the project be established on a tentative basis and that the problem formally be reviewed after the submission of the first full annual report (in the late spring or early summer of 1963).



25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

file

Date: _____

From Sherman Kent

To: W. Sheldon. 7F1P

What went to the DCI
was this minus the
cover page ~~type~~ plus
a typed version of
the draft memo of
transmittal signed
by Romney.

